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Abstract
The article addresses the issue of indigenous agency and its influence on the contestation of indig-
enous rights norms in an extractive context from the perspective of organizations representing 
people, whose recognition as ‘indigenous’ is withheld by the Russian authorities. The article argues 
that a governance perspective and approach to recognition from ‘below’ provides a useful lens 
for comprehensively exploring strategies on norms contestation applied by these groups in the 
authoritarian normative context of Russia. Based on findings from a case study of Izhma-Komi 
organizations in the northwest Russian Arctic, the article identifies three strategies utilized by these 
organizations. By mobilizing inter-indigenous recognition, forging alliances with environmentalists 
and negotiating with an oil company, Izhma-Komi organizations have managed to extend certain 
rights and power previously not granted to them in an extractive context locally.
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Introduction 
In 2012, an indigenous organization called Izvatas, representing the Izhma-Komi 
ethnic group from the northwest Russian Arctic, organized an international confer-
ence ”Arctic Oil: Exploring the Impacts on Indigenous Communities,” under the 
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auspices of Greenpeace International. It took place in Usinsk, the Komi Republic. 
The delegates issued a draft resolution, the Joint Statements of Indigenous Solidar-
ity for Arctic Protection, signed by 15 indigenous groups, including two permanent 
participants in the Arctic Council (AC).1 In 2013, during the AC ministerial meeting 
in Kiruna, Sweden, the statement was presented and promoted for the public as the 
united position of the Arctic indigenous peoples. However, further expansion of the 
coalition was blocked by the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), which has strongly 
criticized Greenpeace for its ‘attempt to speak on behalf of the Arctic communities.’2
In 2015, Nikolay Rochev, the chairman of Izvatas, visited Nunavut, Canada during 
the next AC ministerial meeting. Rochev told the Inuits about the Izhma-Komi’s 
experience of living next to oil extractive activities and called on the ICC to join the 
coalition demanding action from the AC to protect the rights of indigenous peoples 
impacted by oil and gas development in the Arctic.3 Given the expressed concerns of 
the ICC that the coalition was backed by Greenpeace, Rochev reacted in the follow-
ing way: “There is a common assumption that environmentalists and corporations 
use indigenous peoples for their interests. Why shouldn’t we assume that it can be 
the other way around?.”4 Soon after the trip to Nunavut, Izvatas and Lukoil-Komi, a 
Russian oil and gas development company, signed an official agreement. The agree-
ment granted Izvatas’ constituents a right comparable to Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) and thus created a precedent. For the first time in contemporary 
history, Lukoil signed an agreement directly with an indigenous organization (IO) 
representing a group whose recognition as ‘indigenous’ is withheld by the Russian 
authorities.5
These events highlight numerous interrelated issues that current debates widely 
frame and discuss in the language of governance and politics of recognition. The 
contemporary Arctic region is becoming a competitive arena for diverse nonstate 
actors (both insiders and outsiders), including indigenous organizations, corpora-
tions, environmental and conservation groups. In a globally networked society, these 
actors are increasingly linked to each other by a large number of formal and infor-
mal connections, ‘through horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.’6 
 Horizontal (reciprocal) relations between these networks provide nonstate actors 
with an effective tool to gain recognition from the Arctic nation states and politicians. 
To be accepted as a useful contributor in governance debates, especially in areas 
of high stakes, these nonstates are becoming engaged in dynamic, network-based 
processes of coalition building, and increasingly using the opportunities offered by 
globalization and communication revolution. 
There is another side to these events related to a widely shared observation in 
sociological and international relations debates concerning the ambiguous nature of 
indigenous rights.7 While different actors may agree on the general purpose of the 
norms, respect and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, they may contest 
the specific parameters of these norms. Who is indigenous, and who is not? Who can 
speak on behalf of indigenous peoples and who cannot? In which situations should 
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these norms be applied? All of these questions are relevant to the Russian extractive 
context. As Russia’s approach to the recognition of indigenous peoples differs from 
those applied by international organizations, the extractive context seriously jeopar-
dizes the situation of peoples whom the authorities do not consider “indigenous,” 
which makes their rights even more vulnerable to violations. Over the last decade, 
a growing scholarship on indigenous issues has generated considerable knowledge 
on indigenous agency (power) in an extractive context across the Russian Arctic.8 
However, when it comes to studying how indigenous actors assert their agency in 
horizontal, less hierarchical relations with other nonstate actors, there certainly is a 
need for more comprehensive analysis.
This article addresses the issue of agency and its influence when it comes to con-
testing indigenous rights norms in an extractive context from the perspective of 
organizations representing people whose recognition as ‘indigenous’ is withheld by 
the Russian authorities. The term ‘indigenous organizations’ (IOs) is used here in a 
broader sense to include different types of entities, created by indigenous peoples to 
protect their rights and to serve the diverse interests of their communities (societal, 
economic, political, etc.). Rather than viewing these entities in isolation and as a 
mere part of Russian civil, business and political society, the article places them in 
global communication networks and observes their direct involvement in the gover-
nance of extractive activities, albeit mainly at the local level. The article analyzes the 
horizontal relationships between these IOs and other indigenous and environmental 
organizations and oil companies to explore the scope of their agency (power) and 
better understand the resources and strategies that help them to succeed in a given 
context. The core issues the article presents are: whether and how these IOs can 
succeed in their attempts to contest the norms, which they perceive as unjust and 
illegitimate, under a political regime that is flawed in terms of rule of law, good gov-
ernance, and human rights commitments. 
The analysis is designed as an in-depth case study, and traces the activities of the 
Izhma-Komi IOs in a local extractive context. The analysis considers the experience 
of changing norms by Izhma-Komi IOs as an outstanding case, rather than as a 
representative trend in the Russian North. Two notable observations argue for the 
uniqueness of the case. Despite the lack of recognized indigenous status, these IOs 
managed to reach a stakeholder agreement with Lukoil that granted their constitu-
ents rights comparable to FPIC. In contrast to many companies involved in onshore 
resource extraction in the Russian Arctic, Lukoil is receptive to the issue of indige-
nous rights as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR).9
The choice of Izhma-Komi IOs, however, needs additional explanation since 
there are numerous research articles that have been published on the Izhma-Komi.10 
Existing studies address issues of governance and recognition with a focus on the 
 Izhma-Komi’s hierarchical relationship with the Russian state, and explore the rea-
sons why the Izhma-Komi have failed to ‘be recognized by the authorities as indig-
enous.’11 Unlike these authors, yet inspired by their findings, I have focused on an 
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analysis of Izhma-Komi IOs’ horizontal relations with other indigenous and envi-
ronmental organizations and with Lukoil company, taking a different methodologi-
cal approach to concepts of governance and recognition. The article contributes to 
the debate in a twofold way. Firstly, the study argues that, even though the agency 
of Russian IOs in governing extractive activities remains negligible, the prevailing 
‘victim’ paradigm falls short in portraying the contemporary situation, which has 
emerged in a domain beyond the IOs hierarchical relationship with the state. Sec-
ondly, the study argues that focusing on the governance perspective and approach to 
recognition from ‘below’ provides a useful lens to explore a broader spectrum of the 
relations these organizations engage in, as well as their strategies to contest norms in 
the authoritarian normative context of Russia.
The article consists of six sections. Following the introduction, the second part 
presents an approach to studying interrelations between norms, agency, and reco-
gnition in an extractive framework of governance. The third part describes the case 
study and methodology. The fourth part reviews legal norms, which constitute 
indigenous rights and recognition in the Russian extractive context today to show 
what norms the Izhma-Komi organizations have tried to recategorize vis-à-vis their 
interactions with indigenous, environmental, and corporate actors within the local 
domain of extractive governance. The fifth part explores three agential strategies of 
the Izhma-Komi organizations to show how using specific resources and outcomes 
has enabled a normative shift in their relations with environmental organizations and 
with the oil company. The final part presents the conclusion and discussion in light 
of current debate and implications for future studies.
2.  Norms and agency in the governance framework: interrelations through 
actors’ mutual recognition
Unlike state-centered approaches to studying issues of governance and recognition, 
this analysis draws on other families of approaches: governing as governance, and 
recognition from ‘below.’ Both approaches, while acknowledging the dominance of 
the state institutions in governance and recognition processes, aim to bring into view 
non-state actors and a much broader spectrum of their relations, occurring outside 
the state level. These approaches provide a useful lens for explaining the influence 
of agency and power of indigenous actors and the importance of local context in 
contesting norms.
The etymological denotation of the term governance comes from the Latin word 
gubernare, which means ‘to direct, rule, govern.’ Despite the contested connotations 
of the concept, it is often used as a ‘means of encapsulating the collective steering of 
society in the provision of collective goods.’12 Governance in its broad sense suggests 
that in governing modern societies, not only the state but two other societal entities, 
markets and civil society, have a prominent role.13 Governance inherently refers to 
the process of organizing societal entities within a ‘state-market-society’ triangular 
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framework with multidimensional and multileveled interactions directed to respond 
to major societal problems and to create societal opportunities.14 Each of the vertices 
of the triangle is viewed as a group of diverse organizations, peoples, practices, and 
networks, rather than as a single actor. Their relations are examined as socially con-
structed, normative, and contextually based; moreover, they imply power dynamics 
and have processual and outcome dimensions.
Norms, as one of the key institutional elements of governance and recognition, 
entail a dual quality.15 The dual quality of norms implies that norms are both sta-
ble (structuring) and socially constructed, and, thus, interrelated with the agency 
(flexible). The notion of ‘agency’ is considered as the ‘capability of the actors in 
doing things to act independently of social structures in making their own deci-
sions, choices and to act upon them,’ which inherently ‘implies the exercise of 
power.’16 Norms, as social constructs, never remain valid by themselves but need 
constant affirmation by the actors through their agency and interactions in a par-
ticular context. Owing to the dual quality of norms, actors have agency either to 
reproduce dominant norms within the structures or to utilize the possibility of at 
least slightly ‘contesting’ and ‘reconfiguring’ the meaning of these norms. Agency, 
whether individual or collective, can take many forms, which vary from resistance 
to ‘not acting,’ depending on the amount and character of resources available to 
the actors to exercise it.17 The resources, ‘allocative’ (material) and ‘authoritative’ 
(non-material), can vary significantly in different institutional arenas and domestic 
contexts.
A recognition approach ‘from below’ is useful to explain IOs’ practices of norms 
contestation within a governance triangle. The approach originates from a broader, 
ontological perspective of understanding recognition as an irreducible dimension 
of any practice of calling into question the dominant power relations and prevail-
ing social norms of society from the position of those without institutional power.18 
From this perspective, indigenous claims for recognition are not limited to claims 
made on the state for state recognition; they can be equally concerned with material 
and symbolic, structural, and subjective issues.19 
In a nutshell, this approach to contesting norms by indigenous actors centers on 
an understanding of the ambiguous character of indigenous rights norms. That is, 
their content, proscriptions (what the norm enables and prohibits) and parameters 
(the situation in which the norm applies) may be a subject to different interpreta-
tions. It argues that in any relation, actors mutually recognize themselves and each 
other in numerous ways, often simultaneously. In terms of appropriate behavior in 
these relations, actors rely on their background information and the local context. 
Because actors may not share a common context or background, this can generate 
disagreement over norm components and lead to contesting the norm. Indigenous 
actors, as holders of a counterpower, present their contestation claims to dominant 
actors, both state and non-state, with an aim to engender social transformation and 
to contribute to broader norms, principles, and institutions.
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Studies describe contemporary Russian governance as an irregular triangle, 
where the tripartite relationship between ‘state-business-society’ is practically non-
existent.20 However, bilateral relations do exist between the vertices of the triangle: 
government with business, government with society, and society with business.21 In 
all these relationships, the government plays the most assertive role, setting up the 
terms of the dialogue vis-à-vis society and business, and controlling who can partici-
pate. Russian civil society and IO entities are subject to paternalistic attitudes by the 
state and given a passive role. In the ‘Russian style’ of CSR the state does not merely 
function as an intermediary; in fact, the state deliberately replaces IOs in their rela-
tions with the business sector, dictating what the IOs need, and forcibly imposing a 
sort of ‘social tax’ on business.22 
While this governance system serves badly all the parties involved, promoting 
corruption, feeding paternalistic expectations, and circumscribing them from learn-
ing by dialogue, the IOs end up paying the highest price from both a short- and 
long-term perspective. Among the significant structural shortcomings for the IOs 
in this governance system is a lack of institutionalized forums for dialogue with the 
authorities and business at the initiative of the IOs (except in extreme events, such 
as protests). Though Russian IOs benefit from new resources that globalization, the 
digital revolution, and internalization of the indigenous movement have made pos-
sible, the Russian authoritarian regime tends to control and limit the availability of 
these resources to indigenous actors. An alliance with global indigenous and envi-
ronmental opposition, once the most powerful and effective tool to pressure author-
ities and business towards indigenous rights commitment, is no longer a safe option, 
owing to recent restrictions on NGOs policy and regulatory obstacles (‘foreign agent 
law,’ ‘undesirable organizations law’).23 Due to the backlash against IOs as ‘foreign 
agents’, several IOs were blacklisted for receiving external funding, while others ter-
minated joint projects with international partners.24 
3. Presenting a case and a methodology 
Izhma-Komi or Izvatas is one of the most distinctive subgroups within the Komi 
people, the titular minority of the Komi Republic in the northwest Russian Arctic 
(Figure 1). Although nowadays the group is settled across the territories of the eight 
regions of Russia, its largest community resides in Izhma municipality of the Komi 
Republic.25 The Izhma-Komi is the only subgroup of the Komi engaged in reindeer 
husbandry. It has its own language (a dialect of Komi), a strong local identity, and 
a high degree of group solidarity.26 Like their predecessors, the Izhma herders con-
tinue to practice large-scale reindeer husbandry aimed at industrial livestock pro-
duction of meat, skin, and velvet antlers. Their lifestyle is semi-nomadic. Although 
the reindeer graze on the Bolshezemel’skaya Tundra, the herders have their large 
permanent settlements at Izhma municipality in Sizyabsk, where their families live 
and where they return with their herds each winter.27 As part of the tundra between 
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the White Sea and the Urals, Bolshezemel’skaya Tundra covers the contemporary 
territories of two subjects of the Russian Federation: the Republic of Komi and 
the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (NAO). The geographical proximity to NAO along 
with their semi- nomadic reindeer husbandry makes the Izhma-Komi ‘to the largest 
extent connected with the Nenets population of the tundra,’ in terms of history, cul-
ture, language, trade and close kinship, through intermarriages.28
In the story of the Izhma-Komi and their relationship with the state, history mat-
ters significantly. The Komi Republic is one of Russia’s peripheral regions, whose 
territorial borders, status in the official administrative hierarchy, and population 
composition changed dramatically because of Soviet economic and nationalities 
policies. The Republic received its national-territorial autonomy in 1921, while it 
lost access to the Arctic Ocean and a large part of the Bolshezemel’skaya tundra, 
which was assigned to the newly established Nenets Okrug, following administrative- 
territorial reforms in 1929.29
Figure 1.30 The Republic of Komi, Russian  Figure 2.  Izhma district (rayon), the Komi 
  Federation.   Republic.
In the Soviet system of governance, the autonomous status of the national terri-
tory reflected its place in the administrative hierarchy (in declining order from union 
republic to autonomous republic, to autonomous oblast, to national autonomous 
okrug) and assumptions about its titular nationality for self-governance.31 Given the 
ideologically declared ‘backwardness of small nationalities of the North,’ Soviet leg-
islators granted them ‘titular nationality’ in okrugs, but never in oblasts or republics. 
Because of the Republican status of the Komi autonomy, the central authorities 
denied Izhma herders’ demand for recognition as a ‘small nationality of the North.’ 
Indigenous Agency and Normative Change from ‘Below’ in Russia
149
As a result, the authorities expelled Izhma-Komi from ministerial official statistics 
and directives on ‘small nationalities of the North’ and, thus, excluded them from 
special state protection and support.32 
Despite using the Izhma’s herding style as a ‘blueprint’ for the development of 
reindeer husbandry in the remote territories of the Soviet North, the central authori-
ties never considered reindeer husbandry among the priorities for the Komi regional 
economy.33 In the command economy, the Komi’s economic objectives were exten-
sive industrial exploitation of the Republic’s vast natural resources. The Komi’s mod-
ern history of industrial development originates in the late 1920s, when processes 
of nation-state building in the Soviet Union were especially active and when the 
northern periphery of the vast territory became an important land frontier for forced 
industrialization and expansion of the GULAG system until the end of 1950s. The 
industrial development of the Timan – Pechora oil and gas province, the Pechora coal 
basin, construction of the North Pechora Railway, internal migration, and the forced 
displacement of peoples from other parts of the U.S.S.R, have largely influenced 
demographic processes in the Republic and the composition of its modern popula-
tion. One result was a huge long-term decline of the Komi within the Republic’s popu-
lation: from 92% in 1926 to 24% in 2010.34 As the Komi became a minority within 
their national Republic, the Izhma-Komi became a minority within the minority, 
bearing the costs of the expansion of the country’s resource-based economy.35
The case study applies sociological and historical analysis to examine the activi-
ties of two Izhma-Komi organizations, Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko and Izvatas, within 
the timeframe 2000–2018. The empirical data was collected using qualitative meth-
ods, including in-depth semi-structured interviews, analysis of documents, and par-
ticipatory observation during three study trips to the Komi Republic in February 
and June 2012, and in March 2018. All interviews were conducted in Russian, and 
the majority were recorded. The final list of informants comprises 29 individuals 
selected through a purposive sampling technique. These informants included man-
agers, staff, and activists from Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko, Izvatas, Save the Pechora 
Committee, and Fraternity of Izvatas, as well as representatives from the Izhma 
municipal authorities, regional academics, and journalists. In addition to the Komi-
based informants, indigenous experts and activists in Moscow (November 2018), St. 
Petersburg (May 2018), and Tromsø (October 2018) were also interviewed. Docu-
ments analyzed were archival materials of Izvatas (1989–2014), Izhma municipality 
(2003–2017), open-access reports on CSR of Lukoil-Komi (2003–2017), and pub-
lications in the media covering Izhma-Komi, Izvatas, Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko, and 
Lukoil-Komi. The participatory observation was conducted during the Izhma-Komi 
festival Lud and the Sixth Congress of Izvatas, both in June 2012. The data collected 
were transcribed and analyzed by a mix of techniques, including coding and inter-
pretative analysis. The analysis of primary data was combined with secondary data 
analysis, collected through desk-research. Triangulation of data sources and data 
collection methods was applied to increase the credibility and validity of the results. 
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4.  Izhma-Komi status at the Russian indigenous governance and  
recognition order 
As Jakeet Singh states, norms of indigenous legislation serve the governors (govern-
ment) to contour ‘indigenous-non-indigenous’ boundaries and to charge indigenous 
policy: by (de)legitimizing those of the claimants, who will be targeted or excluded 
by the policy and who will be granted or denied the rights and benefits related to the 
indigenous status.36 The analysis distinguishes between two groups of norms within 
Russian indigenous governance and recognition, in order to assess the current legal 
status of the Izhma-Komi people in an extractive context: norms on the recogni-
tion of indigenous status, and norms on the recognition of special indigenous rights 
within the extractive context.
As Russia is a multi-ethnic country (the 2010 national census lists 194 ethnic 
groups), its recognition approach differs from those applied by the UN system bod-
ies, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the World Bank. The coun-
try has refrained from endorsing the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, and has not ratified ILO Convention 169. The Russian state approach to 
‘who is indigenous’ is established by the category of korennye malochislennye narody 
(KMN). The law defines KMN as ‘peoples living in the territories of the traditional 
settlement of their ancestors, preserving a traditional way of life and a traditional 
economic system and activities, numbering within the Russian Federation fewer 
than 50,000 persons, and recognizing themselves as independent ethnic communi-
ties.’37 The numerical hallmark divides the country’s indigenous population into two 
groups: KMN or small-numbered (less than 50,000) and large-numbered (more 
than 50,000). As the majority of KMN live in the northern territories of Russia, 
the legislator specifically introduced a category of korennyye narody Severa, Sibiri i 
Dal’nego Vostoka (KMNS). As legitimate claimants to special rights and protection 
in extractive contexts, the authorities only consider groups meeting all the criteria 
of the state’s definition of ‘indigeneity,’ i.e. KMN and KMNS. Consequently, the 
present number of those who can claim KMNS status in Russia and its related rights 
has been limited by the authorities to only 40 groups.38 Given the fact that, since 
2000, the state has not recognized a single ethnic group as KMNS, some scholars 
have even introduced the idea of so-called ‘recognition moratorium’ in the country.39 
Article 69 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993) guarantees KMN 
rights according to universally recognized principles and norms of international law 
and international treaties signed by Russia. In the early 2000s, Russian authorities 
identified the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples and normatively affirmed 
them in three federal laws: ‘On the Guarantees of the Rights’ (1999), ‘On Organiza-
tion of Obshchinas’ (2000), and ‘On Territories of Traditional Nature Use’ (2001).40 
These constitutionally protected rights include, but are not limited to, the following: 
right for judicial protection of lifestyles, cultures, and languages; right to participate 
in self-government; right to establish and co-manage the Territories of Traditional 
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Nature Use (TTNU);41 guarantees on using land in TTNU free of charge for tra-
ditional economic activities; right to compensation for damages due to extractive 
and developmental activities in their TTNU; right to form Obshchina;42 and right 
to alternative military service. During Putin’s presidency, legal norms relating to 
indigenous peoples have become subject to ongoing changes, leading to an erosion 
of indigenous peoples’ rights regarding land, natural resources use, and political and 
public participation.43
The second group of norms, according to the analysis, refers to recognition of the 
special rights of indigenous peoples within an extractive context. Globally, norms 
of protection of indigenous rights are united and promoted under the umbrella of 
the FPIC principle.44 In the mid-1980s, states and corporations worldwide began 
to affirm the normative foundations of the FPIC by committing themselves to align 
their extractive operations in consultation with affected indigenous communities, 
recognizing their right to contribute to decision-making processes. In Russian legis-
lation, legal norms relating to indigenous people in an extractive context constitute 
derivatives from the norms assigned to the KMN and KMNS, because the author-
ities only grant special rights and protective guarantees in a developmental context 
to groups with KMN and KMNS status. This group of norms is subject to a tangled 
web of federal, regional, and local regulations, which in aggregate are unstable, con-
tradictory, often simulative, undeveloped, and lack full compliance with the inter-
national legal requirements of FPIC.45 While Russian legislation formally requires 
informing, consulting, and allowing participation of KMN (largely through public 
hearings), the lack of consistent incorporation of the FPIC and enforcement mech-
anisms in the country’s federal legislative framework is a serious threat to the funda-
mental rights of indigenous peoples.46 
In the legal reality of the federal Russian state, these norms both de jure and de 
facto, as well as the gap between them, vary significantly from one region to another. 
Given the asymmetrical character of federal indigenous governance, eight regions 
of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) can be broken down into 
two groups in terms of protection of indigenous peoples in an extractive context.47 
The first group is comprised of only three regions: Nenets Autonomous Okrug, 
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). These 
regions have relatively progressive regional legislation and law enforcement mecha-
nisms (such as an ombudsman for indigenous rights, ethnological expertise, damage 
and compensation assessment due to industrial development) to protect indigenous 
rights guaranteed under their jurisdiction.48
The Komi Republic falls into the second group, comprising the rest of the AZRF 
regions, characterized by a poorly developed agenda on issues related to indigenous 
peoples and which does not receive priority attention from the regional governors. 
Despite Izhma-Komi applications for KMNS status, the authorities continue to con-
sider them non-KMNS. Instead, they are listed as the Komi ethnic group, with a 
popu lation of 202,348 people, according to the 2010 census. The Izhma-Komi’s 
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rights concerning extractive industries lack a special legal designation and are left 
to be regulated by the universalistic norms of the Russian Constitution, sectoral 
laws (Water-, Forest-, Land Codex, and Fishing Law), and less formal agreements 
between their organizations and extractive corporations. 
5. Izhma-Komi organizational strategies to contest existing norms 
5.1 Mobilizing legitimacy through ‘inter-indigenous’ recognition 
The authorities have always recognized reindeer husbandry as one of the traditional 
activities of the indigenous peoples of the North, and the Izhma-Komi as reindeer 
herders.49 Both Izhma-Komi organizations have attempted to use ‘reindeer herding’ 
markers to claim their legitimacy as indigenous, albeit toward different recipients 
and using different administrative and communicative channels. 
The cooperative of reindeer herders Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko (1992) was based 
on a bankrupt state farm (sovkhoz) Izhemskyi in Sizyabsk. In 1994, the cooper-
ative was one of the largest in the European Russian North totaling 31,000 rein-
deer and 345 herders, organized in 21 brigades.50 The herders were primarily from 
the Izhma-Komi ethnic group, with a few herders from a mixed Izhma-Komi and 
Nenets ethnic origin, often belonging to related families. After the collapse of the 
Soviet command economy and a radical decrease in northern welfare benefits and 
subsidies, the Izhma herders, like other northerners, strived to survive in the new 
free-market reality. In the early 2000s, the economic situation in the country stabi-
lized, and the authorities began to support reindeer husbandry again. However, in 
contrast to herders in neighboring NAO, this change was not positive for the Komi 
herders.
Historically, NAO was founded and designed as the first ethnically defined ter-
ritory for small nationalities of the North. The European Nenets served as a model 
of integration into socialist society in line with Soviet nationalities and economics 
policy.51 The Russian authorities have continued to promote and intensively subsi-
dize reindeer husbandry in NAO, considering it one of the central elements of the 
region’s social and economic profile.52 NAOs was the fourth region to issue a special 
law ‘On reindeer husbandry’ (2002),53 as the Nenets reindeer cooperatives turned 
into the ‘North’s pioneers’ in signing private agreements with oil and gas companies 
designed to negotiate terms of co-existence.54
After the federal reindeer husbandry subsidies came into force, Izhemskiy ole-
nevod i Ko moved from the Komi region to neighboring NAO, re-registering their 
property in 2005. At the time, NAO was experiencing a dramatic decline in reindeer, 
and the authorities had strong political and economic interest in receiving 32,000 
healthy Izhma reindeer into regional Agriportfolio. Favorable subsidies on reindeer 
meat production and helicopter transportation to the tundra were part of the bargain 
between the Izhma-Komi herders and the NAO authorities, promoting a ‘win-win’ 
solution.55 
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But even after the cooperative registered in NAO, the herders kept their houses 
and families in Izhma municipality. The cooperative also had an office and a small 
suede production factory in Sizyabsk, employing some of the herders’ wives and 
relatives. Working in NAO on a rotational schedule, the herders returned from the 
tundra with their herds to their families in Komi. Every summer the herders’ child-
ren left Komi for NAO to help their fathers during the school vacation. In 2018, all 
260 herders of the cooperative were from Komi.
The other Izhma-Komi organization, Association Izvatas, was founded in Izhma 
in 1990 on a wave of indigenous mobilization and activism, due to Glastnost and in 
response to growing ecological devastation and industrial expansion in the North.56 
During the 1990s, despite the active engagement of the first leaders of Izvatas in 
the post-Soviet indigenous movement, Izvatas did not enjoy official membership in 
the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East 
( RAIPON). RAIPON, acting on behalf of all Russian indigenous peoples, holds 
status as the most politically resourceful and networked indigenous organization 
in Russia, recognized both by the Russian government and the international com-
munity.57 The leadership of Izvatas has looked into asserting its legitimacy through 
inter-indigenous recognition by obtaining membership in RAIPON.
Izvatas membership in RAIPON remained an issue until the V RAIPON Congress 
in October 2004.58 According to the informants, Congress delegates were divided into 
two camps regarding Izvatas’ application for membership. Opponents expressed their 
concerns about further expansion in membership in the organization, and argued 
that membership in RAIPON must correspond with the National List of KMNS 
(2006). Proponents insisted that the question of ‘inter-indigenous’ recognition should 
determine membership in RAIPON. They further claimed that the indigenous com-
munity should act differently from the Russian state and above all according to norms 
of indigenous solidarity, reciprocity, and commitment to the international right of 
indigenous peoples for self-determination. The results of the Russian Federation 2002 
Census, with an estimated 15,608 persons identifying as Izhma-Komi, were consid-
ered an additional favorable factor for officially granting Izvatas RAIPON member-
ship in 2004.59 
By using ‘inter-indigenous’ recognition, both Izhma-Komi organizations have 
promoted their organizational legitimacy and strength. They have successfully cap-
italized on capacity building, networking, and aligning with indigenous partners 
domestically and internationally (e.g., International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Institute for Ecology and Action 
Anthropology). Membership of Izhma-Komi organizations in RAIPON and the 
Reindeer Herders’ Union of Russia has granted Izhma-Komi school graduates with 
fellowships to continue their studies at the Institute of Peoples of the North under 
the federal education program for indigenous youth. More importantly, in the con-
text of growing oil extractive developments in NAO and Komi, piggybacking with 
KMNS (organizationally and symbolically) has provided Izhma-Komi organizations 
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with a crucial authoritative resource in their negotiations with the Lukoil company, 
as will be elaborated upon below. 
Herding and registration in NAO allowed Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko to claim its legit-
imacy as a stakeholder and to start signing private agreements with oil and gas com-
panies operating in NAO’s Bolshezemelskaya tundra since 2005. However,  Izvatas, 
speaking on behalf of the whole Izhma-Komi community, including those not involved 
in reindeer herding, lacked similar resources. Izvatas urgently needed to explore and 
mobilize additional resources to negotiate the rights of their constituents in an oil 
extractive context, if not as KMNS, then at least as a rights-bearing community. 
5.2 Strengthening through alliances with environmentalists 
In an extractive context, the rights of large indigenous groups (more than 50,000), 
which include Izhma-Komi, are subject to the universal norms in the Constitution, 
other federal legislation as well as less formal agreements with extractive corpo-
rations. Studies have widely debated the agreements made between corporations 
and indigenous groups in terms of CSR, whereby corporations have voluntarily 
integrated the social and environmental concerns of their stakeholders into their 
business operation.60 Those Russian oil corporations that are part of the global sup-
ply-chain of hydrocarbon resources must not only comply with domestic legislation, 
but also with international CSR guidelines, which unanimously recognize local com-
munities affected by the company’s operations as key stakeholders and as a ‘rights 
bearing’ community.61 
CSR in Russia, as described in the theoretical chapter, is determined by the 
country’s irregular governance triangle. CSR Russian style means that corporations 
prefer to communicate with the authorities instead of dealing with IOs; ie. the gov-
ernment speaks ‘on behalf ’ of the indigenous communities and deliberately replaces 
the IOs in doing so. Today, strategic alliances with environmentalists have become a 
core element of IOs’ strategy to challenge the existing practice of their relations with 
corporations and force them into dialogue.
Izhma’s indigenous-environmental partnership started at the end of the 1980s and 
was formed by local Izhma activists from Izvatas and the grass-root environmental 
organization Save the Pechora Committee. If anything was exceptional in this stra-
tegic alliance, it was its deep ties at the local level, based on a shared sense of place, 
a common experience of powerlessness, and a desire for protection from extractive-
led threats. The other distinguishing feature of the alliance was a closeness of ties 
between its leadership and Greenpeace. In contrast to other indigenous areas in the 
Arctic, Greenpeace has a strong positive public image in the Komi region, where the 
organization played a decisive role in bringing international attention to the cata-
strophic 1994 oil spill in Usinsk.62 The alliance’s ties with global environmental net-
works became even closer after a former activist at Save Pechora Committee joined 
Greenpeace Russia as head of its Energy Unit.63 
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The first big success of the alliance was a 2001 protest against transnational 
Pechoraneftegaz company plans to drill for oil in the Sebys nature conservation area, 
important hunting and ancestral lands for the Izhma-Komi and their herding routes. 
Despite the governor’s endorsement of the project, the case, with assistance from 
Greenpeace and other human rights organizations, was forwarded to court, which 
terminated all geological activities in Sebys.64 In 2004, the alliance repeated this 
success by opposing a planned project by the Siberian-Urals Aluminium Company 
(SUAL) to build an aluminum and bauxite plant in Izhma and Ukhta municipal-
ities. The public campaign, which was covered by local and international media, 
culminated in 2005, when the alliance’s activists, dressed in Komi-Izhma traditional 
costumes, protested in front of the World Bank office in Moscow. Because of media 
attention and public pressure on all aspects of the project, including its potential 
investors, the SUAL was forced to postpone its development plans in the Komi.65 In 
2008, the alliance successfully litigated Gazprom. The Russian energy giant faced a 
lawsuit for damage to pastures caused by construction of the Bovanenkovo-Ukhta 
gas transmission corridor, and paid compensation to the herders.66
Russia’s largest transnational private company, Lukoil, came to Izhma municipal-
ity in 2001 through its subsidiary, Lukoil-Komi, to develop the Makar’elskoye oil 
field. The Izhma community was in favor of Lukoil-Komi’s development plans, with 
high expectations for investment that would revitalize the economically depressed 
area, and hopes for a better future. Despite booming oil prices during the 2000s, 
the Izhma’s living standards saw little difference. The municipal budget remained 
heavily subsidized, while environmental, employment, migration, and demographic 
records demonstrate negative trends. The agreements between the municipality and 
Lukoil, designed in the ‘Russian style of CSR,’ lacked both transparency and the 
participation of local organizations, and, therefore, were perceived by the public as 
serving the interests of municipal authorities, rather than those of the community. 
Due to regular oil spills and the company’s shortfalls in keeping its socio- economic 
and environmental promises, relations between the alliance and Lukoil soon turned 
sour.67 In 2012, these resentments and unresolved conflicts escalated into mass pro-
tests in Izhma municipality. The alliance demanded that Lukoil’s operations in the 
municipality be banned, as the company had failed to comply with obligations to 
consult affected communities before commencing its extractive activities. Over the 
next few years, local protests in Izhma, backed by Greenpeace, were followed by 
other public events, inside and outside of Russia, as described in the introduction of 
this article. Lukoil hired an entirely new team of ‘crisis managers’ to run the com-
pany’s operation and to protect its social license to operate (SLO) in ‘problematic’ 
Komi. For Lukoil, the conflict with Izhma-Komi, which was publicized by global 
NGO networks and international media such as Al Jazeera, had high reputational, 
economic and political stakes. 
By strategically allying with environmentalists, through horizontal patterns of com-
munication and exchange, Izvatas has received access to new resources (international 
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networks, funding, information), previously not available to them. Owing to these 
resources, Izvatas has managed to utilize international ‘public noise’ in the negoti-
ation process with Lukoil, forcing the company to recognize the Izhma community 
as a legitimate stakeholder regardless of the non-KMNS status of its residents. Fur-
thermore, Izvatas leaders succeeded in forcing Lukoil to consider it as a legitimate 
negotiating partner that speaks on behalf of the community, and to sign a partner-
ship agreement with Izvatas in 2015.
The agreement, however, marked the beginning of a split between Izvatas and 
its environmental allies. Driven by an ‘Arctic sanctuary’ agenda, the environmental 
groups criticized Izvatas for compromising with Lukoil. Since 2015, the relationship 
between Izvatas and its environmental allies continues to be strained over differ-
ences over their vision for community development and the tools needed to achieve 
sustainability.
5.3 Negotiating rights with oil company
Lukoil as a globally operated company, appears to place a strong emphasis on meet-
ing international norms of responsibility and sustainability in its corporate, environ-
mental and social activities. The company was the first among Russian oil companies 
to issue its own Social Codex (2002) and to sign on to the UN Global Compact 
(2006). In 2018, Lukoil issued the Strategy of Engagement with Indigenous  Peoples 
(SEIP), which aims to ‘preserve the traditional way of living of the indigenous peo-
ples in the territories of the company operations.’68 The SEIP emphasizes the com-
pany’s commitment to cooperate with indigenous peoples through multilateral and 
inclusive dialogue in accordance with international indigenous rights. Nevertheless, 
the SEIP considers indigenous peoples as stakeholders (along with the authorities, 
NGOs, and others) rather than indigenous rightsholders.69 These glossy reports 
aside, Lukoil is also known for its environmental misconduct records, especially in 
the Komi region.70
The company has partnership agreements with the regional authorities in the NAO 
and in the Komi, as well as separate agreements with each municipality wherein the 
company operates. These corporate payments to regional and local budgets are typi-
cally framed in terms of CSR, which covers everything from culture to education to 
health care to ecology. In 2017, the company’s social investments through CSR in 
the Komi Republic was estimated to be 2.5 billion RUB71 along with 4 billion RUB 
in NAO. In NAO,72 Lukoil also signs agreements on social-economic development 
with each reindeer enterprise. Spending for these purposes was 336.7 million RUB 
in 2007–2017.73
Nowadays, both Izhemskiy olenevod i Ko and Izvatas have direct stakeholder 
agreements with Lukoil-Komi on an individual and confidential basis. Izhemskiy 
olenevod i Ko signed its first agreement with Lukoil in 2006, after the cooperative 
registered in NAO. It is a ‘private-private’ type of agreement, concerned with the 
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conditions under which the cooperative signs off its pasture lands to the company 
as a licensed industrial plot. The agreement opens with a memorandum of under-
standing, which is followed by its ‘financial part’. The financial part consists of a 
price tag that shows the price that the cooperative receives from the company as 
compensation for using its pastures and for disturbances caused to reindeer migra-
tion routes. The innovative aspect of the agreement is its recognition and stipulation 
of the cooperative’s right to use these payments at its discretion, either to cover 
annual operational costs or to invest them into future business developments. The 
design of the financial part of the agreement as a price tag is not a common practice 
among the herders. As Stammler and Ivanova (2016) argue, in contrast to the Komi 
reindeer cooperatives, cooperatives under Nenets’ leadership choose more in-kind 
services (i.e., snowmobiles, petrol, veterinary medicines, and forage for reindeer).74 
Empirical data collected from Izhma herders in the Komi supports Stammler and 
Ivanova’s view that the Izhma herders are skilled negotiators and entrepreneurs. This 
claim, however, requires more in-depth and comparative analysis. The informants 
left without answering the question about the share of the company’s payments in 
the cooperative’s annual budget. Experts familiar with the situation in NAO have 
indicated that extractive payments could constitute up to 40%–50% of the coopera-
tive’s annual budget, since numerous companies operate in the area and have signed 
agreements with them.75 
Izvatas has a short history of signing agreements with Lukoil, which started in 
2015. Designed as a ‘public-private’ agreement between the parties, it concerns the 
conditions under which the community provides Lukoil an SLO in the territory of 
the Izhma municipality. The agreement includes three groups of conditions set forth 
by Izvatas to Lukoil for obtaining an SLO. The first group refers to FPIC and aims to 
ensure that the interests and rights of Izhma local communities, including the right 
to reject industrial operations, are recognized and considered by the company before 
any extractive-related activities in the territory of the municipality. The second group 
concerns the financial support the company provides to fund activities to protect the 
 Izhma-Komi language, culture, and traditions. For instance, the company co-funds the 
famous traditional festival Lud, a landmark social and cultural event for  Izhma-Komi 
gathering several thousand participants from other regions of Russia and abroad. The 
third group refers to the company’s investments into development of local human 
capital. The company has funded several fellowships to talented Izhma-Komi youth at 
well-regarded Russian universities.76 At the time of this study, two-thirds of the annual 
budget of Izvatas came from the regional authorities’ grants via the nationalities’ pol-
icy channel. Previously engaged in international collaboration, nowadays Izvatas has 
no joint activities with partners abroad due to the recently restricted NGO regulations 
(e.g., foreign agent law).77 The backlash against IOs as ‘foreign agents’ has increased 
the value of Lukoil’s contributions to the budget of the organization.
Because of the confidentiality of the agreements both Izhma-Komi organi-
zations have with Lukoil, there is little to say about how the content of these 
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agreements or the negotiation process leading to them meets international stan-
dards and the company’s indigenous rights commitments. The analyses of the 
informants’ perceptions of the agreements with the company reveal four issues 
that the informants consider as crucial for their organizations. First, through a 
negotiating process with the company around compensations, the organizations 
get a chance to voice their priorities about investments and development paths 
they see as sustainable for their organizations and communities. By voicing these 
concerns, the organizations exert their agency, trying to make a difference in their 
constituents’ position economically, socially and symbolically. Second, for both 
organizations, the financial payments from the oil company contribute to financial 
diversification. In turn, this diversification of funding strengthens the organiza-
tions’ independence in relation to the authorities and increases the organizations’ 
symbolic status among similar civil society actors. Third, the informants perceive 
the company’s payments as highly controversial in terms of legitimacy, social 
equality, expropriation of common resources, and ecology. The informants largely 
expressed their concerns about the ability of these payments to promote sustain-
able development and cultural survival in the long-term. Fourth, many of the 
informants see their indigenous rights as compromised and negated by the rights 
they received as stakeholders. 
6. Conclusion 
The article traces the journey of two Izhma-Komi IOs across time and space to 
investigate the scope and influence of their agency to contest indigenous rights 
norms in the context of Russian oil development during the 2000s. The findings 
expand an understanding of the influence of the Izhma-Komi IOs’ agency (power) 
when it comes to indigenous rights norms and challenging these norms, despite 
the lack of state recognition of their constituents as KMNS. The study presents 
these IOs as co-producers of the localized version of common norms, showing that 
the Izhma-Komi’s normative understanding of indigeneity is informed by their 
local context, history, and other factors significant in their relationship with the 
state.
The analysis identifies three horizontal strategies the IOs applied to challenge 
the normative base of their constituents’ status and rights in the extractive context, 
including mobilizing through inter-indigenous recognition, alliancing with envi-
ronmentalists and negotiating with an oil company. It shows how these strategies 
enabled the IOs to successfully change norms locally, in their relations with an oil 
company, and to ascertain certain rights and exert power previously not available 
to them. According to the analysis, the IOs’ strategies have become more informed, 
networked, strategic and pragmatic, absorbing both cooperation and conflicts. 
The findings from the Izhma-Komi case study do not entail any claims for broader 
generalizations and conclusions. Nevertheless, they suggest trends, factors, and 
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conditions that can impact IOs’ agency in their negotiations with extractive com-
panies. The findings of the study suggest that despite the achievements made, the 
empowerment of these IOs, in their relations with oil companies, should not be over-
estimated. The agency of IOs to contest the normative base of their relations with the 
company depends on the willingness and receptivity of the company to negotiate. 
The latter rests on the company’s economic interests in the territory of operation, 
its ownership status, and integration into global markets. Lukoil has much at stake 
in the Komi in terms of finance, politics, and reputation. The company’s sensitiv-
ity to its image in global markets provided the Izhma-Komi IOs with tools to bar-
gain over their stakeholders’ rights and to impose the international public leverage 
locally. Though more research is needed, in today’s context of ‘state capitalism’ in 
the energy sector, it is hypothetically unlikely that the outcomes for the Izhma-Komi 
would be similar, if they had to negotiate their rights with state-owned energy giants 
such as Rosneft or Gazprom.
As the analysis reveals, in order for IOs to achieve normative change when it comes 
to relations within the Russian ‘bad governance’ triangle, it is critically important for 
IOs to build coalitions with outside international actors such as indigenous and 
environmental organizations. A coalition with an outside actor can prove pivotal for 
a local IO to be recognized and accepted by a company as a potential partner for 
dialogue and negotiation. However, the Izhma-Komi-Greenpeace coalition demon-
strates that the role of an outsider can also be controversial, highlighting biases 
within the Arctic IOs community itself. Assuming that indigenous-environmental 
alliances in the Russian Arctic are likely to increase, it can become more challenging 
for ‘young’ Russian IOs to internationalize their partnership with environmentalists 
and to benefit from such a partnership without strategical support from ‘mature’ 
Arctic IOs.
The durability and sustainability of the normative shifts in relations with the oil 
company achieved by the Izhma-Komi IOs, remain another concern. The issue is not 
limited to the informal and personalized character of the agreements signed. Lack 
of institutionalized mechanisms to enforce these agreements inevitably jeopardizes 
their durability from a long-term perspective. However, a more significant concern 
is what will happen with the Izhma-Komi after extractive activities in the region are 
over, given the limited period of oil projects, mostly between 20 and 50 years. The 
leaders of the Izhma-Komi IOs link their hopes for the future ‘after the big oil’ to the 
development of local ethnocultural tourism and promotion of reindeer products on 
the market, including export abroad. 
The way in which the Izhma-Komi manage to maintain their lifestyle, culture and 
economic activities (traditional and innovative), will depend on the quality of the 
natural environment that the oil company leaves behind. While recognition of the 
Izhma-Komi as ‘stakeholders’ from the oil company is a step forward, it falls short 
of recognizing their rights as indigenous rights holders. Ultimately such recognition 
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will depend on the Russian state and its constitutional and international commit-
ments to indigenous peoples’ rights.
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